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Sino-ROK Relations at 15: 
An Overview and Assessment 
 
Taeho Kim* 
 
Abstract 
 
For the past 15 years since their diplomatic normalization 
China and South Korea (ROK) have improved their bilateral ties to 
such an extent that each represents for the other one of the largest, if 
not the largest, trade and investment partners. China is also 
perceived as playing an essential role in the ongoing Six-Party Talks 
over North Korean nuclear issues and other likely major issues on 
the Korean peninsula.  Yet, there also exists a growing yet little-
discussed list of potential problems and issues underlying their 
otherwise prosperous relationship. Prime examples include the North 
Korean “refugees” in China, the history of Koguryo, and the longer-
term “rise of China”. After identifying principal trends and major 
developments in China’s post-Cold War relationships with South 
Korea in particular and with the two Koreas in general this paper 
examines actual and likely future differences between China and 
South Korea on a panoply of peninsular and regional issues, 
including the evolving US-South Korean alliance relationship. 
Overall, in short, the current state of the Sino-South Korean 
relationship can be likened to standing right in the eye of the typhoon 
without knowing where the shelter is. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 24 August 2007 both China (the People’s Republic of China) and 
South Korea (the Republic of Korea) will celebrate the fifteenth 
                                                                 
* Taeho Kim is a Professor and Director of the Center for Contemporary China Studies at the 
Hallym Institute of Advanced International Studies (HIAIS), Hallym University, Korea. This is 
a revised version of a paper presented at the international conference on “China and Korea: A 
New Nexus in Asia?” organized by Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Lingnan 
University, Hong Kong, 30-31 May 2007. Participation in the conference was made possible 
by Korea Foundation support. 
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anniversary of establishing diplomatic ties between the two countries. 
The result, in brief, has been a resounding success or - to quote 
Chairman Mao Zedong -“dizzy with success.” 
 
As widely publicized, there has been a remarkable improvement in all 
major aspects of their bilateral relations. In particular, China now has 
emerged as the ROK’s “four number ones”: its largest trading partner, 
its largest export market, its largest trade-surplus source, and its top 
outbound investment destination. It is indeed music to a Korean 
economist’s ears as the ROK economy has remained stagnant and its 
US$ 23.4-billion trade surplus with China in 2005 constituted almost 
all of the country’s total trade surplus (i.e., $23.5 billion)!1    
 
For China, the ROK constitutes its third-largest trading partner - after 
only the United States and Japan - and was the largest source of foreign 
investment in 2005. Furthermore, China is widely perceived as having 
played and will play an essential role in the ongoing Six-Party Talks 
and other likely major issues on the Korean Peninsula. While there is 
no shortage of impressive economic and trade statistics, it suffices to 
note that the significance of their bilateral relations is unquestioned. 
 
Moreover, as emphatically noted during the mutual visits by their top 
leaders such as President Roh Moo-hyun (October 2006) and Premier 
Wen Jiabao (April 2007), the prospects for growth in the non-economic 
aspects of their bilateral ties are equally promising as well, if not more 
than the economic one. At the same time, the South Korean public - 
unlike their counterparts in Japan and the United States - has over the 
years maintained a favorable view of China and perceived that the 
latter’s role on Korean peninsular issues would increase in the future.  
 
As discussed in greater detail below, however, their interests could be 
significantly in conflict with each other when they are confronted with 
some concrete issues and longer-term agendas on the Korean peninsula 
                                                                 
1 Unless noted otherwise, all statistical data concerning China’s relations with the two Koreas 
are based on the official publications of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MOFAT). Occasionally, such primary sources as the data compiled by the Trade Research 
Institute (TRI) of the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) are employed; but they 
can be easily corroborated with those of the MOFAT. All currencies in the essay are 
measured in U.S. dollars.  
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and in the East Asian region. Prominent examples include, but are not 
limited to, a North Korean contingency, the future status of the US 
forces in Korea (USFK), the question of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs) in North Korea, and the military capability and strategic 
orientation of a unified Korea. It is equally important to note that, 
notwithstanding the dawning reality of a “rising China,” South Korea’s 
China policy is both a means and a subordinate goal of its longer-term 
national security objectives.    
 
This paper attempts to shed some light on these little-discussed yet 
highly consequential aspects of the Sino-ROK relationship not only by 
addressing their 15-year ties but also by gauging their future ties in a 
balanced and comprehensive manner. After identifying principal trends 
and major developments in China’s post-Cold War relationships with 
South Korea in particular and with the two Koreas in general, it 
examines actual and likely future differences between China and South 
Korea on a panoply of peninsular and regional issues. The paper then 
addresses South Korea’s emerging security challenge of balancing the 
American alliance and Chinese cooperation. Overall, it poses a critical 
question: how would the China factor play out in South Korea’s future 
security environment and in the evolving US-South Korean 
relationship? 
 
To telegraph the major arguments and findings of this paper, the 
seeming “convergence” of interests between Beijing and Seoul in many 
aspects of their bilateral ties does not necessarily mean that the former 
is supportive of South Korea’s major policy goals - especially when 
they come to concrete issues or longer-term questions on the Korean 
peninsula. They share “common aversions”, not “common interests”, in 
a sense that both countries share a desire to avoid war on the peninsula 
and to prevent North Korea’s nuclearization.2 It is thus necessary to 
understand correctly that the ongoing trends and developments in South 
Korea’s interactions with the United States and China could be those of 
such a fundamental, sustaining, and impregnated nature as to warrant 
                                                                 
2 This is the term used by Brad Glosserman for describing the longer-term nature of the Sino-
ROK relationship. See his “US-China: The Next Alliance?” South China Morning Post, 30 
October 2003. 
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educated guesses and reasoned speculations for the unfolding future 
strategic configuration on the Korean peninsula and beyond. 
 
China’s Post-Cold War Relations with the Two Koreas 
 
Before analyzing China’s relationships with South Korea in particular 
and with both Koreas in general, it is necessary to understand the two 
major undercurrents that have buttressed China’s Korea policy. One is 
the importance of the Korean peninsula in the eyes of the Chinese for 
strategic and economic reasons, and the other is its evolving policy 
goals toward the Korean peninsula.  
 
To begin with, the Korean peninsula encapsulates China’s continuing 
yet elusive quest to restore its past glory, to make a “rich country, 
strong army” (fuguo qiangbing), and to achieve great-power status. For 
one thing, not only was Korea traditionally part of the Sinocentric 
world-order up to the mid-19th century, it was also there that the 
fledgling People’s Republic of China confronted the mighty United 
States 50 years ago. For another, the 1992 Sino-South Korean 
normalization and their fast-growing economic and other ties testify to 
the vicissitudes of post-Cold War politics and the validity of China’s 
ongoing reform and open-door policy. For still another, as North 
Korea’s newest nuclear gambit and South Korea’s security hedging 
behavior portend, China’s potential to become a full-fledged major 
power will likely be tested again on the rapidly changing yet uncharted 
Korean peninsula. This fundamental fact has taken on a new relevance 
in light of the global discourse over the “rise of China” - be that 
“China’s peaceful rise” (heping jueqi), 3  “China’s peaceful 
                                                                 
3 See, for example, Xia Liping and Jiang Xiyuan, Zhongguo Heping Jueqi [China’s Peaceful 
Rise] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexueyuan Chubanshe, 2004); Zheng Bijian, “China’s 
Peaceful Rise and Opportunities for the Asia Pacific Region,” China Strategy, Vol. 3 (July 
20, 2004), pp. 2-4. 
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development” (heping fazhan) 4  or the “China threat theory” 
(weixielun).5 
 
For this reason, throughout the 1990s and continuing to date China has 
pursued a set of identifiable and consistent policy goals toward the 
Korean peninsula. They include: a) stability and tension reduction a la 
denuclearization; b) economic cooperation with South Korea and 
traditional ties with North Korea; c) its own role and influence, which 
often come at the expense of the ubiquitous United States; and d) 
harmonization of its peninsular interests with its global and regional 
ones— most notably its own unification agenda with Taiwan. 
 
Notwithstanding a host of unforeseen developments and shocks since 
the 1990s on the peninsula and beyond - including the first and second 
nuclear crises, the sudden death of Kim Il Sung, and America’s regional 
hegemony, there is no doubt that China’s policy toward the Korean 
peninsula has achieved an overall success. This can be broadly 
grouped into three major issue-areas: economic/trade, 
political/diplomatic, and military/security. 
 
Economic/Trade Issue-areas 
 
Since their diplomatic normalization in 1992 China and South Korea 
have improved their economic relationship remarkably, for a 
confluence of factors. The normalization itself opened a huge market 
and cheap labour in China to the Korean companies, which were 
struggling with rising labour costs in the wake of Korea’s  own 
                                                                 
4 For the difference between “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development,” see Sukhee Han, 
“The Rise of China and East Asia’s Changing Order (in Korean), New Asia, Vol. 11, No. 3 
(Autumn 2004), pp. 113-34, particularly pp. 116-23.    
5 There is simply too much literature on the “China threat.” Most representative single volumes 
include Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San 
Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s 
Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000); Edward Timperlake and 
William C. Triplett, Jr., Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to 
America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999). For various reactions from the regional actors to 
a rising China, see Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, eds., The China Threat: Perceptions, 
Myths, and Reality (Richmond, UK: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., 
The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War 
College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). 
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economic success in the 1970s and 1980s. An ensuing adjustment in 
Korea’s economic structure, together with geographical proximity and 
comparative advantage in capital and technology-intensive goods, has 
allowed the Korean companies to concentrate on the newly-found 
Chinese market. 
 
A $6.4-billion trade in 1992 grew over 20 percent annually to record 
US$23.7 billion in 1997, $31.3 billion in 2000, $57 billion in 2003, 
and $118 billion in 2006 - making each one the other’s major trading 
partner (See Table 1 below). In 2003, for instance, China for the first 
time emerged as South Korea’s largest export market and by the end of 
2004 China had become South Korea’s largest trading partner as well.6 
 
Table 1. Trends of the ROK’s Trade and  
Investment with China, 1992-2005  (million dollars, percentage) 
Exports Imports 
Investment 
on China 
China/Overseas 
 Investment 
 Value 
Increase 
Rate Value 
Increase 
Rate Balance Case Value 
Case 
(%) 
Value 
(%) 
1992 2,654 164.7 3,725 8.3 -1,071 170 141.1 34.2 11.6 
1993 5,151 94.1 3,929 5.5 1,222 381 264.0 55.4 20.9 
1994 6,203 20.4 5,463 39.0 740 841 632.1 56.6 27.5 
1995 9,144 47.3 7,401 35.5 1,742 748 839.5 56.5 26.8 
1996 11,377 24.4 8,539 15.4 2,838 734 892.9 50.2 19.7 
1997 13,572 19.3 10,117 18.5 3,456 628 718.6 48.0 19.6 
1998 11,944 -12.0 6,484 -35.9 5,460 258 676.6 41.4 16.2 
1999 13,685 14.6 8,867 36.7 4,818 454 347.6 41.9 12.1 
2000 18,455 34.9 12,799 44.3 5,656 753 605.0 37.1 8.4 
2001 18,190 -1.4 13,303 3.9 4,888 1,022 543.6 48.0 29.9 
2002 23,754 30.6 17,400 30.8 6,354 1,361 977 55.55 27.56 
2003 35,110 47.8 21,909 25.9 13,201 1,666 1,490 59.97 39.71 
2004 49,763 41.8 29,585 35.1 20,178 1,746 1,598 57.62 36.00 
2005 61,915 24.4 38,648 30.5 23,267 2,232 2,580 51.1 40.3 
                                                                 
6 According to the recent data released by the MOFAT, South Korea’s trade with China in 
2006 was $118 billion with a surplus of $21 billion. According to the Chinese statistics—
which includes the ROK’s trade portions with Hong Kong, it was $134.3 billion with a deficit 
of $45.3 billion. 
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Source: Compiled from the database of the Korea International Trade Association 
(www.kita.net). 
 
On the other hand, their bilateral trade structure has over the years 
shifted from “inter-industry trade” to “intra-industry trade” - a logical 
consequence of China’s economic catching-up. In particular, the trend 
of an increasing intra-industry division of labour has become obvious 
in a wide range of manufacturing industries such as petrochemicals, 
textiles, iron and steel, machinery, electronics, and automobiles (See 
Table 2 below.). 
 
Table 2. Intra-industry Index Between the ROK and China  (percentage) 
 Manufactures Petrochemicals  Textiles Steel Machinery Electronics Automobiles 
1992 11.96 2.30 7.37 11.47 9.39 22.37 4.52 
1996 20.76 5.26 13.26 17.32 9.10 56.07 2.93 
2000 26.03 3.40 15.91 12.77 15.48 52.53 14.73 
2005 30.21 4.24 23.13 22.39 26.67 48.98 8.08 
Source: Database of the Korea International Trade Association (www.kita.net). 
 
At the same time, in the ROK’s 2005 exports to China semi-finished 
goods and parts/components occupied 42 percent and 40 percent, 
respectively. It is well known that foreign companies stationed in China 
have played an increasingly important role in Sino-ROK trade. As such, 
foreign companies’ import shares from Korea increased from 24.7 
percent to 55.5 percent in the period from 1995 to 2004. 
 
According to Choong Yong Ahn, a noted Korean expert on the Chinese 
economy, the bilateral trade in technology and goods has also changed 
to a more high-tech-oriented one. The high-tech share of ROK’s exports 
to China rose from 8.1 percent to 41.5 percent over the period from 
1995 to 2005, while that of China increased from 9.7 percent to 31.7 
percent in the same period.7  
 
                                                                 
7 Choong Yong Ahn, “Overview of Trends in China-South Korea Economic Relationship,” a 
paper delivered at a conference on “China and Korea: Partners or Competitors?” co-
sponsored by the Asia Foundation and Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), Press 
Center,  Seoul, Korea, June 13, 2006, p. 6. 
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China is also the ROK’s top outbound investment destination. In 2005 
alone, US$2.6 billon was registered by Korea, an increase of $1 billion 
from that of the previous year (See Table 1 above.). The amount 
accounted for 40.3 percent of the ROK’s total overseas investment 
value in that year. According to Korea Ex-Im Bank statistics, out of 
Korea’s cumulative investment of $9.9 billion in China by October 
2004 a whopping 85.46 percent (or $ 8.5 billion) was made in the 
manufacturing sector, indicating the ROK’s over-dependency on China 
in terms of export, investment, and the manufacturing sector as well.8  
The ROK’s cumulative investment in China by the end of 2006 hovered 
around $17 billion in 15,900 cases and served as a complement to its 
growing exports to China.9  
 
All in all, there is no doubt that China’s rapid economic modernization 
presents Korea with both an opportunity and a challenge, especially as 
its economy has remained stagnant for years. This in turn calls for an 
adoption of a panoply of new economic strategies on the part of Korea 
not only in the Chinese market but also in the global market. Included in 
the new strategies is the continuing sustenance of the ROK’s 
comparative advantages in selective sectors (e.g., telecommunications, 
semiconductors, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and automobiles). 
Additionally, Korean companies have taken measures to diversify 
investment patterns and areas, concentrate on selected commodities and 
social strata, and “localize” their research and development (R&D) 
centres and factories in China. These strategies, if successful, are likely 
to prolong the ROK’s relative competitiveness vis-à-vis that of China 
for a certain period of time. The same strategies, however, could pose a 
                                                                 
8 As is often the case with trade figures, there is a far cry between the ROK’s and China’s 
official figures on Korean investment in China. For instance, the ROK’s official data indicate 
that its cumulative investment in China by June 2004 was $9.2 billion, while the Chinese official 
figure was $23.2 billion, which is based on the execution basis. The contracted amount was 
much larger, which was $42.3 billion by the same period. Choong Yong Ahn cites that by 
June 2005 Korea’s accumulated FDI to China was $12.02 billion, which is a total of 13,600 
cases on the arrival basis and 48.4 percent of the ROK’s total outbound FDI cases - which is 
closely collaborated with those figures of mine. 
9 According to China’s official statistics, the ROK’s cumulative investment in China by the end 
of 2006 was $34.9 billion in 43,130 cases. See also Eun Mee Kim and Jai S. Mah, “Patterns 
of South Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment into China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 56, No. 6 
(November/December 2006), pp. 881-97.    
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political and security question to the ROK that has been little discussed 
and is under-researched in Korea. 
 
On the people-to-people contacts, a total of 5.3 million people visited 
the other country in 2006.10 The frequency of contacts between the two 
sides is evidenced by over 20,000 Korean companies in operation 
throughout China, 779 passenger flights per week (i.e., over 110 
passenger flights per day) between six Korean cities and 30 Chinese 
cities, and by about 57,000 Korean students in China, which means that 
as there are over 160,000 foreign students in China one out of every 
three foreign students in China comes from South Korea!11 An array of 
other impressive statistics abounds as to tourism, educational and 
cultural ties - most notably “Korean waves” (Hanliu) or “China fever”- 
between the two countries. This positive trend, which is likely to 
continue for the foreseeable future, would undoubtedly contribute to the 
ROK’s economic development. At the same time, however, it should be 
remembered that its increasing economic dependency on China is a 
double-edged sword which could restrain the ROK’s diplomatic 
options by allowing China to enhance its position and influence on the 
peninsula. 
 
In a sharp contrast, Sino-North Korean economic relations have been 
severely constrained for many reasons including their different 
economic structures, North Korea’s economic and financial problems, 
and North Korea’s self-imposed diplomatic isolation.  Even if China 
remains North Korea’s largest trading partner, accounting for an 
average 40 percent of the latter’s total trade, their two-way trade fell 
like a descending stair from the highest $900 million in 1993 to $656 
million in 1997 to $488 million in 2000. Since then, however, it has 
                                                                 
10 In 2006 a total of 4.4 million South Koreans visited China, while 900,000 Chinese made a 
visit to South Korea. These figures are, of course, the number of visits, not the number of 
actual people as many visited the other country multiple times a year.   
11 The figures are drawn from an interview with the ROK’s ambassador to the PRC. See 
Yonhap News, 9 January 2007.  
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gradually increased from $740 million in 2001 to $1,023 million (i.e., 
$1.023 billion) in 2003 to $1,580 million (i.e., $1.58 billion) in 2005.12 
 
A set of structural economic problems such as chronic fiscal and trade 
deficits, low competitiveness of its export goods, and lack of hard 
currency has long prohibited the improvement of North Korea’s trade 
relationship with China. In fact, North Korea’s principal export items to 
China such as non-ferrous metals are in short supply within North 
Korea as well, demonstrating again the gravity of its economic 
predicament. As long as the principles of the market economy reign in 
Beijing, prospects for an improved trade relationship with Pyongyang 
look bleak for the foreseeable future. 
 
In fact, contrary to Chinese officials’ wishful utterances on the 
resilience of its Communist neighbour, the depth of North Korea’s 
economic problems is real and could become much worse in the years 
to come. 13  For the sake of its own interests including peninsular 
                                                                 
12 An increase in China’s exports to North Korea for the past few years should be interpreted 
as a form of Chinese assistance. The question of North Korea’s dependency on Chinese oil 
and food has recently taken on new relevance in the discussion of possible international 
sanctions against North Korea. According to various official ROK documents, North Korea 
imported an average one million tons of oil from China in 1991-96 but it fell to a half million 
tons and below since 1997. Its grain import from China is far more complicated to account 
due in part to China’s own harvest level and export policy, but approximately 300,000 tons of 
grain have been imported from China since 1997. For a series of recent but higher-level 
accounts of North Korea’s oil and grain imports from China, see John J. Tkacik, Jr., “China 
Must Pressure Pyongyang (December 17, 2002),” available at 
www.heritage.org/Press/Commenrary/ed123102b.cfm; Phillip P. Pan, “China Treads Carefully 
Around North Korea,” Washington Post, January 10, 2003, p. A14; Phillip C. Saunders and 
Jing-Dong Yuan, “Korea Crisis Will Test Chinese Diplomacy,” Asia Times, January 8, 2003; 
Matthew Forney, “Family Feud: China vs. North Korea,” Time, December 23, 2002; and 
Mark O’Neill, “Beijing Faces a Stern Test Over Nuclear Crisis in Its Back Yard,” South 
China Morning Post, January 3, 2003. A recent report indicated a modest increase of trade 
volume between the two countries in 2006 from $1.58 billion in 2005 to $1.7 billion. See 
Yonhap News, 20 February 2007. 
13  For an excellent discussion on the depth and prospect of North Korea’s economic 
problems and their various effects, see Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,” 
Policy Review, October/November 2004, pp. 23-48; Chaiki Seong, “A Decade of 
Economic Crisis in North Korea: Impacts on the Military,” The KIDA Papers, No. 3 
(October 2003), pp. 1-9; Paul VanWagenen, “U.S. Economic Sanctions— Non-traditional 
Success against North Korea,” Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 32, No. 1 
(Fall 2000), pp. 239-61.    
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stability, China encourages the North Korean leadership to undertake 
reform measures aimed at more fundamental resolution of their 
economic problems. If the North Korean regime indeed takes a 
fundamental reform path, however, it will surely be the most perilous 
moment for regime survival. Pyongyang’s choice has been “deterrence 
through instability.” This, in short, constitutes China’s longer-term 
strategic dilemma as to the North Korean question.14  
 
Political/Diplomatic Issue-areas  
 
Chinese attempts to strike a balance in its approach to both Koreas and 
to maintain traditional ties with North Korea have so far produced a 
mixed result due to a combination of factors, including North Korea’s 
closed nature, external hostility and self-imposed isolation. While it is 
difficult to pinpoint the date, China for some time has wished to 
transform its traditional ties with Pyongyang based on ideological 
affinity and particularistic ties to a more mutually beneficial, state-to-
state relationship. But the course of actions North Korea followed in 
the 1990s reveals that its interests diverge from those of China. 
 
As a matter of fact, a series of major developments on the peninsula 
throughout the last decade and beyond, such as the simultaneous entry 
into the United Nations by both Koreas, South Korea’s diplomatic 
normalization with the Soviet Union and China, its opposition to North 
Korea’s attempt to replace the extant Armistice Agreement with a peace 
treaty with the United States, and the Chinese arrest of Yang Bin 
(designated by North Korea as the head of  a new special 
administrative area) in spite of the apparent protestation by North 
Korea - to name but a few - further demonstrated the strained 
relationships between North Korea and China and the latter’s overall 
“convergence” of interests with South Korea’s. 
 
On the other hand, aside from the vast improvement in their economic 
and other relationships, China and South Korea now regularly hold 
high-level meetings. On the Chinese side as well, the new lineup of the 
                                                                 
14   For a further discussion of the issue, see Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign 
Relations in the Post-Cold War World (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007).   
 12 
so-called “fourth-generation leadership” after the Sixteenth Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Congress in November 2002, in which those 
with substantial provincial or bureaucratic background were 
represented, strongly indicates China’s continuing priority on economic 
development, which depends on regional and peninsular stability, 
amongst others. 15 In short, the generational turnover in the Chinese 
leadership, in tandem with its need to maintain political and social 
stability, is likely to reinforce its current pragmatic policy orientation 
toward the Korean peninsula. In a nutshell, it can be plausibly argued 
that China’s domestic economic reform, coupled with the end of the 
bipolar Cold War, has had the most far-reaching impact on the 
evolution of the relationship between China and the two Koreas and 
would continue to put an emphasis on the importance of growing ties 
with Seoul. 
 
Military/Security Issue-areas 
 
In a similar vein, since the early 1990s and particularly after the death 
of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, security and military ties between China 
and North Korea have increasingly been subject to the rigidity of their 
political relations and China’s national interest-based policy toward 
the Korean peninsula. Lack of mutually beneficial agenda, North 
Korea’s domestic problems, and growing Sino-South Korean ties have 
also militated against the continued development of their bilateral 
relationship in this important issue-area. 
 
In fact, their political and military contacts have undergone several 
different phases. From April 1989 to August 1992, General Secretaries 
Kim Il Sung (three times), Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin and all their 
defense and foreign ministers visited the other’s capital. Even during 
the period from Beijing-Seoul normalization in August 1992 to the 
death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, ranking Chinese officials such as Hu 
Jintao, Qian Qichen, and Chi Haotian as well as North Korean military 
                                                                 
15  See, for example, Lowell Dittmer, “Leadership Change and Chinese Political 
Development,” China Quarterly, No. 176 (December 2003), pp. 903-25. For a discussion 
on the prospects for U.S-China relations under Hu Jintao, see Jaewoo Choo, “Hu Jintao’s 
Foreign Policy and Sino-U.S. Relations: From A [sic] Korean Perspective,” New Asia, Vol. 
11, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 80-112.    
 13 
officers such as Choi Kwang, Ok Bong Lin, and Kim Il Chul made 
mutual visits. But there were no summit meetings. 
 
In particular, from the death of Kim Il Sung until June 1999, when 
Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Kim Young Nam 
visited China, there had been an appreciable decline in the frequency 
and the rank of Chinese visitors. Since the death of Kim Il Sung the 
nonmilitary, working-level contacts between the two sides were made 
mostly at the vice-ministerial level and among their respective 
international liaison, foreign affairs, economic and provincial-level 
units. Overall political and military contacts between Beijing and 
Pyongyang have also shown a gradual but an unmistakable decline. 
Even the military-to-military contacts between their ranking officers 
have been mostly good-will visits and are symbolic and ceremonial in 
nature, not task-oriented meetings on salient military and security 
issues.16 
 
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s May 2000 visit to China - which 
was followed by his subsequent visits to China in January 2001, April 
2004, and January 2006 - as well as the feverish diplomatic activities 
that followed are undoubtedly intended to alleviate the growing pains 
of the North’s  deepening economic and diplomatic vulnerabilities as 
well as to arrest a further deterioration in its strained relationship with 
China. There are, however, no appreciable effects on their military-to-
military contacts in particular and on their overall ties in general. 
 
Visits in the first half of the 2000s by such top Chinese leaders as Jiang 
Zemin (September 2001), Jia Qinglin (May 2002), Wu Bangguo 
(October 2003), Li Changchun (September 2004), and Hu Jintao 
(November 2005) helped to restore the level of Chinese visits, but their 
practical significance should not be exaggerated.17  Finally, it is entirely 
                                                                 
16 For a detailed analysis on the military-to-military relationship between China and North 
Korea up to 1997, see Taeho Kim, “Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang: 
Growing Strains amid Lingering Ties,” in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., 
China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 295-321; idem., 
Recent Changes in Sino-North Korea Relations and the ROK’s Policy Options (Seoul: 
KIDA, 2001 in Korean), pp. 60-68.  
17 For an analysis on the mutual visits between Beijing and Pyongyang, see Yonhap News, 
September 24, 2004.  
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possible that having maintained mutual contacts of little substance for 
over a decade both Chinese and North Korean militaries are now 
undergoing a serious yet little-publicized version of their own “alliance 
fatigue.”18 
 
Similarly, while China still maintains the July 1961 Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with North Korea (the 
only country with which China has a formal military alliance), the treaty 
has been widely interpreted in Beijing and elsewhere to be operative 
only when North Korea faces an unprovoked attack from an outside 
enemy - a highly unlikely event. It is ironic to note that many Asian 
security analysts and officials now believe that having a Chinese treaty 
obligation to a vulnerable North Korea would almost certainly help 
contribute to stability on the peninsula. 
 
Between South Korea and China, on the other hand, there have been 
more frequent, more regular, and higher-level visits in recent years in 
the so-called “military exchanges and cooperation” field. 19 Divided 
into three aspects - i.e., high-level visits (e.g., defense and service 
chiefs), working-level contacts (short-term visits and mutual 
consultation), and military academic and research exchanges 
(conferences and sports events) - their militaries have gradually but 
steadily increased the scope of military-to-military exchanges and 
cooperation. It should be noted, however, that compared with the other 
nonmilitary aspects of their bilateral ties the “military exchanges and 
cooperation” have yet to be balanced and institutionalized. 
 
                                                                 
18 Alliance fatigue, which is a natural symptom for any old alliance relationship, is particularly 
acute in the Sino-North Korea case as there is a growing divergence of interests between the 
two. See Sukhee Han, “Alliance Fatigue amid Asymmetrical Interdependence,” Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 155-79. 
19 This does not mean, however, that their military-to-military ties are balanced or symmetrical 
in terms of frequency and the ranks of the visiting officers. For a comprehensive treatment of 
the PLA’s military diplomacy in the 1990s in general and China's military relations with both 
Koreas, see Kenneth Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations 
(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1999), esp. pp. 66-68. 
 15 
Some Salient Issues between South Korea and China 
 
It is noteworthy that the above developments between South Korea and 
China have resulted in a shift in the South Korean public’s perception 
of China to that of a benign, pragmatic economic partner - for better or 
worse. In fact, popular South Korean images of China are difficult to 
generalize and have become more diverse over the years. Reflecting 
their checkered relationships with the outside world in general and 
China in particular throughout the 20th century, South Koreans eye 
China in essentially three different images: a traditional great power, an 
image which had been built upon their largely unequal yet amicable 
pre-19th century ties; a Cold-War adversary represented by their hostile 
experience during the Korean War (1950-53) and thereafter; and a new, 
pragmatic country with the so-called “good-neighborly, friendly 
relationship,” which has been formed after the Sino-South Korean 
normalization in 1992. 
 
Besides, there exists a spectrum of opinions within South Korean 
society regarding the most desirable state of bilateral ties between 
itself and China. A small but growing number of human rights activists, 
together with religious, agricultural, and environmental groups, are 
most critical of China’s policies in their respective areas of concern. 
China’s (mis)handling of North Korean “refugees” in China, its 
opposition to the visit by the Dalai Lama to Seoul, and a host of trade 
disputes are most recent examples.20 
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are a sizable number of people who 
subscribe to the “comprehensive cooperative partnership” (quanmian 
hezuo huoban guanxi) between the two countries. Those with 
commercial, governmental, and other institutional ties with China tend 
to be in favor of a stable and prospering relationship with China, even 
if the looming economic implications of a rising China have made them 
more sober than before. Understandably, the rapid improvement in 
                                                                 
20 The Chinese government’s position is that there are no North Korean “refugees,” let alone 
dissidents, in its territory. Its position has triggered a series of strong protests from various 
NGOs based in South Korea and elsewhere. See the editorial, Chosun Ilbo, December 11, 
1999, p. 2. On cases of trade dispute see KOTRA, Dae joongkuk muyeok bunkyu sarye 
[Cases of Trade Dispute with China] (Seoul: Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, 
2002). 
 16 
Sino-South Korean ties throughout the 1990s has generated a thick web 
of individual and institutional interests within South Korean society, 
which remain sympathetic to Beijing. 
 
Of greater relevance to this study is how the South Koreans perceive 
the value of China and of the US-South Korean alliance in comparative 
terms.21 To make a long story short, up to the early 2000s the South 
Korean public’s view remained “somewhat critical” toward the United 
States and “fairly friendly” toward China, whereas the policy elite 
aired the opposite view - that is, “somewhat critical” toward China and 
“fairly friendly” toward the United States. It is worthy of note, 
however, that the Korean public’s favorable perception toward China 
plummeted after the Koguryo issue [see below] had erupted in 2004.22 
At least for the past three years since the summer of 2004, the United 
States has been singled out as the “most friendly (to the ROK)” or the 
“most supportive of Korean unification” in a host of nationwide opinion 
surveys. 
 
The “China threat” argument, on the other hand, is distinctly a minority 
opinion aired by only a few people scattered in the media, military, and 
ideological communities. There also exists an essential consensus 
among the Korean business community that notwithstanding South 
Korea’s growing over-dependence with China the latter will remain as 
an opportunity rather than as a threat to the future of their business. Few 
foreign-policy analysts in Seoul, including both China and non-China 
academicians, institutional specialists, and journalists, are vocal about 
the possibility of a Chinese military threat to the Korean peninsula or 
advocate policies to “deter,” “contain,” or “constrain” China, unlike 
their counterparts in Washington.     
                                                                 
21 An excellent perceptual study on this critical issue of Korea’s emerging strategic problems is 
available. See Derek J. Mitchell, ed., Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the 
United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2004); Jae Ho Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: 
Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 
(September/October 2001), pp. 777-96. 
22 After the election for National Assembly members, 63 percent of the ruling party members 
(Woori Party) favored a closer ties with China compared with the United States. After the 
Koguryo case became a diplomatic row between the two countries, the figure plummeted to 
10 percent or below. Similar results can be found in other opinion surveys. See, for example, 
Yonhap News, August 10, 2004 and Media Daum, August 19, 2004. 
 17 
 
On the other hand, while the Beijing and the Seoul governments have 
long maintained that they see eye to eye with each other on a host of 
peninsular issues - at least in their official proclamations and high 
rhetoric - there exist subtle but important differences between the two 
on the issues of Korean unification, the USFK, the North Korean 
nuclear and missile programmes, and the US-Japan alliance ties, to 
name but a few. 
 
For one thing, Article 5 of the August 1992 Joint Declaration on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the ROK and the PRC 
reads: “The PRC government respects the Korean people’s desire to 
have the Korean Peninsula unified peacefully at an early date and 
support a peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula by the Korean 
people” (italics added). 23 Since then, all ranking Chinese officials, 
when asked, have articulated their support for a peaceful, independent, 
and gradual unification of the Korean peninsula. Then, a question 
naturally arises: What if the unification is not peaceful, not independent 
(devoid of US involvement?) or not gradual? To the best knowledge of 
this author, none of the numerous ranking Chinese officials have ever 
answered this question to the point. As noted at the beginning of this 
article, China’s prime objective toward the Korean peninsula is 
“stability,” not unification - which is the ROK’s national security 
objective. The fact remains that China’s support for Korean unification 
is not unconditional. 
 
Moreover, since the early 2000s and continuing to date the plight of the 
North Korean “refugees” (or “illegal economic migrants” by Chinese 
definition) has become a very salient bilateral issue between the two 
countries as well as for the international community.24 While there were 
growing numbers of North Koreans entering into foreign embassies, 
international schools, and other sanctuaries in Beijing in the first half of 
the 2000s, the PRC government’s position remains adamant: the issue 
touches upon China’s sovereignty and ethnic issues and thus can be 
                                                                 
23 Unofficial translation by the author. 
24 For the strategic context of the issues, see Jaeho Hwang, “Northeast Asia’s Pandora’s Box: 
North Korean Escapees,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 
2004), pp. 49-72. 
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resolved only between the PRC and North Korea. Besides, it argues, 
the issues should be handled according to - in descending order of 
importance - Chinese domestic law, international law, and humanitarian 
concern. There is a far cry between China’s efforts to project an 
international image as an up-and-coming responsible power in the 
world and the often brutal handling of the North Korean refugees 
against their wishes. 
 
In addition, the Chinese project known as “Northeast Project” (dongbei 
gongcheng), to incorporate the history of Koguryo into their own 
history, is the gravest of all potential problems between the two 
countries.25 While the Chinese government averred that the project was 
an academic endeavor that was begun in 2002 by such provincial-level 
governments as Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, it is anything but an 
academic one. In fact, the “Northeast Project” had begun much earlier, 
in 1996, by the regional academies of social sciences located in the 
three northeastern provinces mentioned above and was ratified by none 
other than Hu Jintao, the current Party General Secretary and then a 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, as a national-level 
project. It is for these reasons that the project was then led by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the party’s policy-
development organ, and that three-trillion Korean won and a manpower 
of about 1,500 were able to be devoted to it. In brief, it is a political, 
not an academic, project of the Chinese central government.  
 
In light of the expected objections from both North and South Korea as 
well as from the world community, what prompted China to engineer 
the historical distortions? First, it stands to reason that the steady power 
shift in Northeast Asia - including China’s rise, North Korea’s nuclear 
crisis, readjustments in the US-ROK alliance, and Japan’s elevated 
status in the US East Asia strategy - must have a place in it. Second, 
North Korea’s future and the two-million strong ethnic Koreans in the 
                                                                 
25  See a flurry of newspaper reports on the subject including B. J. Lee, “Historical 
Differences,” South China Morning Post, August 13, 2004; Edward Cody, “China Gives 
No Ground in Spats over History,” Washington Post, September 22, 2004, p. A25; Howard 
W. French, “China’s Textbooks Twist and Omit History,” New York Times, December 6, 
2004; David Scofield, “China Ups and Downs in Ancient-Kingdom Feud with Korea,” Asia 
Times, August 16, 2004; idem., “China Puts Korean Spat on the Map,” Asia Times, August 
19, 2004.   
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northeastern provinces must remain a serious concern for China’s 
political leaders and strategists. Third, a unified Korea’s possible 
claim over the Gando region - which extends to much of Manchuria - 
well into the future can be nipped in the bud should any ancient 
histories of China’s current northeastern region be incorporated as part 
of China’s own proud and rich history.26 
 
Table 3. Chinese and South Korean Positions on Some Salient Peninsular and Regional Issues 
Issues  Chinese Positions South Korean Positions 
History of 
Koguryo 
· Part of China’s ancient history in its 
peripheral regions 
· (Aware South Koreans’ sensitivity to the 
issue) want a “quiet” and academic 
approach 
· The issue touches upon Korea’s  
national identity and historical 
continuity 
· Call for both academic and 
diplomatic approach 
Korean 
Unification 
· Support peaceful (and “independent”) 
unification 
· In fact, prefers stability to unification 
· De facto support for the North Korean 
regime  
· Peacetime confidence-building 
measures necessary for a North 
Korean contingency 
· Differences exist for specifics 
· Call for discussions on post-
unification relations 
North Korean 
nuclear Issue 
· Support a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula 
· Maintain stability and peace on the Korean 
Peninsula 
· Resolve the issue in a diplomatic and 
peaceful manner 
· North Korea’s nuclear gambit is a 
threat to the peninsula and beyond 
· Call for a diplomatic and multilateral 
solution, including China’s 
“constructive” role 
North Korean 
refugees in 
China 
· A sensitive issue that touches upon 
China’s sovereignty, territories, and ethnic 
issues; “no refugees” in China 
· A bilateral issue between China and North 
Korea, not South Korea 
· Forcible repatriation of them to 
North Korea unacceptable 
· A humanitarian issue 
· A bigger issue in waiting when 
Korea is unified 
US Forces in 
Korea 
· Principled opposition to the stationing of 
foreign troops 
· A historical issue to be discussed between 
South Korea and the US  
· Remain wary of its possible role against 
China or a Taiwan contingency 
· A stabilizing factor on the 
peninsula and in the region 
· Never raise the issue with China 
· Focus of the post-unification USFK 
is regional stability 
North Korea 
missile (re-) 
launching 
· Every country’s sovereign right 
· Opposes international pressure on North 
Korea 
· Will do “what it can” 
· Major source of instability and 
missile development 
· Danger of missile proliferation  
· Call for China’s “constructive” role 
Strengthened 
US-Japan 
alliance 
· “Asian edition of NATO” 
· Will lead to Japan’s rearmament 
· Wary of its anti-China and Taiwan 
contingency role 
· Contributes to peninsular and 
regional stability 
· A bilateral issue between the U.S. 
and Japan 
Theatre 
Missile 
Defence 
· Opposes it for a number of reasons 
· Welcomes South Korea’s non-
participation 
· North Korea as a primary rationale 
for its development 
· South Korea’s geographical, 
economic, technical reasons 
                                                                 
26 For this line of reasoning, see Jun-young Kang, “Hidden Motives behind China’s Northeast 
Project,” Korea Herald, 24 August 2004. The publication date, it should be noted, is the 12th 
anniversary of the ROK-PRC diplomatic normalization. 
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While the South Koreans have so far believed in China’s position that 
an academic issue should be resolved in academic terms only, the 
dawning reality is that the “Northeast Project” is nothing but the 
Chinese government’s official project, aided by the media, the 
academic and policy units, and regional governments. The project and 
the lessons thereof should awaken the Korean people to the dangers of 
the self-fulfilling prophecy about China. Additionally, the recent “China 
bashing” in South Korea, largely triggered by the issue of historical 
distortion, should be harnessed into a new opportunity not only to 
rethink China’s strategic intentions towards the Korean peninsula but 
also to dispel the self-centered “China fantasy” many of us have held up 
to now. 
 
While the above three issues remain the most salient ones, there are 
many other potential problems that may come to the surface one day. An 
overview of potential sources of differences between China and South 
Korea is provided in Table 3. 
 
Balancing the American Alliance and Chinese Cooperation: South 
Korea’s Emerging Strategic Challenge 
 
The relationship between the United States and China is widely 
believed to be probably the most consequential bilateral ties in the 
contemporary world, whose impact reverberates throughout global and 
regional issues. It is thus encouraging to note that both the United States 
and China have since September 11, 2001 worked together to improve 
their otherwise fragile relationship in such diverse areas as 
international terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear moves, and most 
recently their military-to-military contacts. On the other hand, it should 
also be acknowledged that despite their global pretensions and their 
derivative self-acclaimed role for peace and stability the world over, 
the United States and China are countries with different attitudes, 
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diverging perspectives, and conflicting world-views. 27  These 
differences are often brought to bear in their handling of regional and 
peninsular issues.  
 
For instance, notwithstanding the long list of their outstanding disputes 
at both the bilateral and regional levels, China and the United States 
have time and again argued, at the official and declaratory level at 
least, that they share a set of common interests over the Korean 
peninsula – namely, peninsular stability, denuclearization, North-South 
Korean dialogue, and peaceful reunification. The question is: why? 
 
In light of their vast differences in strategic visions, political systems, 
social values, and strategic objectives, notwithstanding their recent 
“normalizing” efforts, it is far more logical and - I would argue - more 
empirically valid to make a case that the United States and China are 
likely to remain divergent over peninsular issues as well. Beneath the 
façade of the “constructive, cooperative, and candid relationship” - the 
Bush administration’s official China policy - moreover, their interests 
could be significantly in conflict with each other when confronted with 
some concrete issues and longer-term agendas. Prominent examples 
include, but are not limited to, a North Korean contingency, future status 
of the USFK, and military capability and strategic orientation of a 
unified Korea. 
 
It is also possible that future political thaw on the peninsula, as we 
thought within our reach in the months after the June 2000 North-South 
Korean summit, could also accentuate, and at a minimum has increased 
the uncertainty over, a host of issues that involve the United States, 
China, and the Koreas.28 Therefore, in light of the possibility for Sino-
American competition, their likely diverging interests over the 
                                                                 
27 See, for example, Bates Gill, “Contrasting Visions: United States, China and World Order,” 
an unpublished mimeo presented at the U.S.-China Security Review Commission Session on 
U.S.-China Relationship and Strategic Perceptions, August 3, 2001. A dated yet still useful 
discussion on the impact of the diverging visions of the United States and China on the Korea 
peninsula can be found in Edward A. Olsen, “U.S. & China: Conflicting Korean Agenda,” 
Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 254-69. 
28 For a recent discussion on the future of the two Koreas, see Samuel S. Kim, The Two 
Koreas and the Great Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), especially 
ch. 6. 
 22 
peninsula, and the “rise of China” (which is largely a fact of life, not an 
assumption, for most East Asian states including South Korea), South 
Korea needs to continuously prioritize its strategic relationships with 
the United States and with China. In practical terms as well as for the 
sake of its national interests, this means that the ROK should be able to 
reap the benefits of its alliance ties with the U.S. in addressing the 
growing importance of the “China factor.” 29  
 
In a similar vein, future changes in inter-Korean relations could have a 
significant impact on the future course of the peninsula and the South 
Korean-US security relationship. Likewise, recent changes in both 
domestic and external dimensions in both South Korea and the United 
States have not only influenced the nature of the alliance, but have also 
raised new issues or old issues in a new form which are endogenous to 
the security alliance. While those substantive issues are largely 
subordinated to both countries’ national interests so far, they could 
become sources of strain for the alliance if left unresolved for long.  
 
As perhaps their divergent perceptions of and policies towards a series 
of ongoing North Korean nuclear crises (e.g., the “Six-Party Talks”) 
best illustrate, 30 the South Korean and the US governments need to 
coordinate their policy toward North Korea more tightly and more 
coherently than has been the case. Policy differences over North Korea 
do not augur well for the long-term development of the South Korean-
US alliance, especially if they have to prepare for the day when they 
                                                                 
29 In particular, see the conference proceedings on The First ROK-U.S.-China Future Forum 
entitled “The Changing ROK-U.S.-China Relationships and the Future of the Korean 
Peninsula,” co-hosted by the Institute for Diplomacy and Security Studies (IDSS) and the 
Center for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS), Hallym University, Shilla Hotel, Seoul, 
October 30, 2004. 
30 For a critical assessment on the North Korean nuclear crisis and on the participating 
nations’ difference interests, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “North Korea Is Poised to Cross 
the Nuclear Rubicon: Will the Canary Die in the Mine?” International Journal on World 
Peace, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 17-28; Michael O’Hanlon and Mike 
Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal With a Nuclear North Korea 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003); Victor D. Cha, “North Korea’s 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?” Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 117, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 209-30; C. Kenneth Quinones, “North Korea Nuclear 
Talks: The View from Pyongyang,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 7 (September 2004), 
pp. 6-12.  
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“run out of common enemies.” It is these kinds of specific policy issues 
and longer-term questions that South Korea needs to take into 
consideration in formulating its strategic plan for its future security 
environment. 
 
Looking Ahead 
 
In closing this paper, it is appropriate to sum up the findings and 
arguments with respect to the questions raised at the outset. First, as 
long as China holds fast to its ongoing reform drive, continued stability 
on the Korean peninsula is a key to its economic and other interests, so 
that it would try to prevent a renewed conflict on the peninsula. For the 
same reason, China will continue to promote a friendly and beneficial 
relationship with South Korea and at the same time it would try to 
retain its lingering ties with North Korea, but it is highly likely that their 
economic ties would be increasingly subject to economic logic, 
structural trade problems, and the state of other issue-areas. In the mid- 
to longer-term, moreover, China would seek to transform its traditional 
“special” ties with Pyongyang based on ideological affinity and 
particularistic bonds to a more normal, state-to-state relationship based 
on hard-nosed national interests and mutual benefits.  
 
Second, the seeming “convergence” of interests - common aversions in 
fact - between Beijing and Seoul in major aspects of their bilateral ties 
does not necessarily mean that the former is supportive of South 
Korea’s major policy goals, especially when they come to concrete 
issues or longer-term questions on the Korean peninsula. Under such 
circumstances and for the foreseeable future South Korea’s “strategic 
prioritization” in its relations with the United States and with China 
would be highly likely to be the most optimal strategic choice, even if 
South Korea should continuously and systematically pursue a specific 
set of confidence-building measures with China. 
 
Third, in light of the longer-term Sino-American competition, their 
likely diverging interests over the peninsula, and China’s growing 
influence over the Korean peninsula, it is entirely possible that China 
will become a source for both despair and hope in realizing South 
Korea’s national objectives. While its growing economic and social 
interdependence with China is highly encouraging and should be 
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continued, South Korea should also aware of its attendant costs in other 
issue-areas, namely, diplomatic and security ones. In a similar vein, the 
intrinsic value of the “China factor” in South Korea’s evolving security 
environment lies not in its supposed balancing role against a ubiquitous 
and unilateral America, but in its potential and likely role in ensuring 
peace on the peninsula - with Korean unification included. In the long 
and often tortuous path to Korean security and unification, China will 
be no substitute for the United States for the foreseeable future. 
 
Fourth, it is this complex set of major external challenges that the ROK 
leadership will face for many years to come. How well and in what 
manner they handle the challenges could significantly affect not only the 
wealth and health of the Republic but also the future of the nation, 
including reunification. Furthermore, now that both the domestic and the 
international contexts upon which the ROK’s foreign and security 
policies have been predicated are also undergoing extraordinary 
changes, it is necessary to understand correctly that the ongoing trends 
and developments in South Korea’s interactions with the United States 
and China could be those of a fundamental, sustaining, and impregnated 
nature which warrant cooler thinking on the unfolding future strategic 
configuration on the Korean peninsula and beyond. 
 
In addition, South Korean concerns with China now range from its 
increasing economic dependency to its heretofore reliance on China’s 
role in the Six-Party Talks to China’s recent economic inroads into 
North Korea. To the best of this author’s knowledge, in recent years 
there have been an increasing number of Korean ‘China scholars’ who 
are more vocal about Seoul’s accommodative approach to Beijing. 
Sukhee Han, for example, has argued to such an extent that China’s 
preferred goal is not de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but the 
prolongation of regime stability in North Korea. Doobok Park, for 
another, has opined that South Korea’s policy inflexibility comes from 
its own [standards] set higher than China expects. For still another, 
Dong-ryul Lee has pointed out that the [South Korean] government’s 
undue expectation on the  [constructive] role of China in enhancing 
North-South Korean relations has [ironically] set up an obstacle for the 
same goal. 
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Barring any unforeseen developments in the near future, it is highly 
likely that a mixture of economic convergence, political anxiety, and 
military indifference would define the ROK’s overall interactions with 
China. Economically, there exists an essential consensus among the 
Korean business community that China is probably the last resort for 
their survival at least for the time being. This sense of urgency on the 
part of business community would likely push for a higher level of 
industrial and technological cooperation between the two countries. 
While the ROK government has recently instituted a system of 
protection mechanisms in response to the growing concern with 
technology leakage, its effectiveness is likely to be severely tested due 
to the growing economic interactions with China as well as to the 
technological nature of the problem. 
 
It should also be borne in mind that a combination of factors such as 
economic over-dependency, the Koguryo case, and China’s economic 
inroads into North Korea have begun to feed political anxiety in South 
Korea. One outcome has been an about-face in the perception of China 
at the public, opinion-maker, and elite levels in South Korea. Another 
is an emerging “dual hedging” strategy by the ROK government that has 
been discernible for the past two years, in which China’s behaviour has 
played a major part.31 Taken together, the ROK government seems to be 
caught between American coercive diplomacy toward and Chinese 
cooptation of North Korea, while a recalcitrant North Korea has made 
little room for the ROK government to maneuver, let alone a major role, 
in managing Korean affairs. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that, while the above developments are 
largely externally driven, South Korea’s changing domestic political 
dynamics remain an important variable in its future interactions with 
China. In retrospect, China has served as a useful policy tool for the 
current ROK government’s peninsula-centered and populist ideology, 
which is often seen as opposed to that of an imposing and unilateral 
America. But the term of the presidential office has less than one year 
left; the president’s popularity rate is as low as ever. Besides, in light 
of the pervasive popular disbelief toward the government’s major 
                                                                 
31 This observation is indebted to my discussions with Robert Sutter and Scott Snyder, in 
Seoul, May and June 2006, respectively. 
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policies - e.g., the government reaction to the North Korean launching 
of missiles and the ROK-US free trade agreement, it would be virtually 
impossible for the ROK government to take any major policy initiative, 
especially when a domestic consensus is absent. 
 
It is this complex context against which the ROK’s overall interactions 
with China should be understood. In the mid- to longer-term, it is 
entirely possible that South Korea’s political divergence with China on 
specific and concrete issues would affect the erstwhile discrete 
interactions with China in other dimensions. One cost-effective way of 
coping with this future uncertainty is to maintain exchanges and 
cooperation with China in select areas, while anticipating and 
preparing for a reversal of its present course toward the Korean 
peninsula. 
 
